Written by: Matt Bunk
Rarely does a government audit or a review from an independent panel say blatantly that wrongdoing was committed by an agency under scrutiny, and the recent report on the Corps of Engineers’ response to the 2011 Missouri River flood was no exception.
But a close study of the 99-page analysis by a group of “independent” experts reveals a lot of subtle, jargon-filled indications that a lot went wrong at Corps headquarters in the months leading up to the flood.
Sure, the report concluded that the Corps did their best to control the flood. But it also exposed serious mistakes that were made along the way and recommended several changes to the way the Corps handles such situations in the future.
And there’s a good reason for the tactfulness: The panel of experts who reviewed the situation was hand-picked by the Corps and relied heavily on information presented by Corps officials. Not only that, but the scope of the analysis was defined by Corps officials.
In fact, the panel decided from the onset that it wasn’t going to assign blame if any wrongdoing had occurred. Check out this passage from page 8 of the report: “Rather than speculate after-the-fact about differences in the required and actual operating decisions, the panel identified ways that future flood operation might be improved through lessons learned.”
That passage is the key to understanding how the panel could find that the Corps could have reduced the impact of the flood yet should remain faultless.
For instance, the panel concluded that the Corps’ estimates of snow levels in the northern plains were way off and recommended steps be taken in the future to make sure the moisture content and depth of the plains snow be measured accurately to avoid a repeat of this year’s flooding.
“It appears that the Corps substantially underestimated the volume of water in the plains and the plains snow in their forecasts,” the report stated. “The underestimation of plains snow and associated wet antecedent conditions might have created a level of confidence that there would be enough storage capacity available in the upper three reservoirs come late spring to handle runoff from mountain snowpack.”
Oops. And it looks like the Corps has known for years that it was getting bad information on plains snowpack but didn’t fix the problem. The panel noted that the Corps’ post-flood assessment of the 1997 flood recommended that, “The forecasting procedure for the plains snowpack part of the annual runoff needs to be evaluated.”
The panel also concluded that the Master Manual doesn’t give adequate operational guidance when extreme flood conditions arise.
“More definite and specific procedures to respond to emergency scenarios can be included in the Manual, which currently leaves a large degree of discretion to the Corps’ Missouri River Basin Water Management and the Division and District Commanders during flood events,” the report stated.
And then there’s this tidbit about releasing water earlier in the spring to create more storage in the reservoirs: “The Corps could have reduced the impact of the flood with more storage and higher releases before the flood, but these actions carried risks and consequences that did not seem appropriate to the Corps at the time they were required.”
The panel reviewed two scenarios that showed what would have happened if the Corps had released more water earlier, determining that “Either scenario would still have resulted in record releases … and would have caused flood damage to some extent. However, flood damage would have been greatly reduced.”
The authors of the report alternated repeatedly between outlining operational mistakes and making excuses for the Corps. Here’s another passage: “During extreme events such as those in 2011, the Corps may want to consider contingency weather forecasts. All of these potential improvements could have contributed to better communication, earlier preparedness and possibly a slight reduction in releases, but given the current state of science, none would have prevented the 2011 circumstances.”
The panel even went so far as to say it’s not totally the Corps responsibility to communicate with local and state officials when flood conditions arise.
“The panel’s first impression about communications was to note that it seems impossible to satisfy everyone’s expectations to be notified promptly and accurately about every decision and eventuality,” the report stated. “Officials along the river in various roles should take part of the responsibility for communications, as they do in other public emergencies. It seems like a formidable task for the Corps to be responsible for all of the communication requirements.”
So it seems the goal of this independent review was to nudge the Corps in the right direction without assigning blame. The Corps made mistakes, but this panel wasn’t going to say that publicly. And it’s a shame that they felt it was more important to protect a federal agency than to speak plainly about what went wrong.
-Matt Bunk is publisher of the Great Plains Examiner.
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